THE EQUAL TREATMENT BENCH BOOK: WHEN SOME ARE MORE ‘EQUAL’ THAN OTHERS
In February 2021 the Judicial College published a revised edition of the Equal Treatment Bench Book. Significantly updated and almost double the length of the previous edition, this new edition represents the first major revision for three years. The aim of the Bench Book is to advance the principles of fair treatment and equality. In so doing, the Bench Book makes suggestions as to steps that judges may take to redress any inequality arising from difference or disadvantage to ensure that there is fairness for all engaged in legal proceedings. Whilst not intended as an expression of the law, “judges [and other court officiants] are encouraged to take its guidance into account wherever applicable. [The Bench Book] is increasingly cited in judgements and by practitioners as to the approach to be adopted.” (p.5)
In December 2021, a new interim edition of the Equal Treatment Bench Book was published, which included significant updates to Chapter 12 Trans People.
There are important changes which depart from the previous, almost absolutist, position on respecting and affirming pronouns and identity in court proceedings. The December 2021 edition acknowledges at section 26:
There may be situations where the rights of a witness to refer to a trans person by pronouns matching their gender assigned at birth, or to otherwise reveal a person’s trans status, clash with the trans person’s right to privacy…
For example, a victim of domestic abuse or sexual violence at the hands of a trans person may understandably describe the alleged perpetrator and use pronouns consistent with their gender assigned at birth because that is in accordance with the victim’s experience and perception of the events. Artificial steps such as requiring a victim to modify his/her language to disguise this risks interfering with his/her ability to give evidence of a traumatic event…
There will be occasions when, after these and relevant factors have been considered, the interests of justice require that a witness or party may refer to the trans person using their former pronouns or name.
This shift is both significant and welcome. The implications of the 2021 Forstater judgement are also discussed. Again, this is an important acknowledgment that the previous position taken in the Bench Book may not be the only legitimate perspective.
However, we remain concerned that these changes may be insufficient to result in a more flexible approach to pronouns. New content emphasises in even stronger terms the vulnerability of transgender people and the risk to them when trans identity is made public. New content on gender critical beliefs emphasises the potential harmfulness of those beliefs as a caveat to their acceptability (and presumably to their permissibility in a court of law).
At section 26 the Bench Book sets out the factors that must be considered before allowing a witness to use sex-based pronouns. It is important to note that this issue must be settled in advance of proceedings and that an individual participating in court proceedings is not simply free to use pronouns as they see fit. These factors include: GRC status, whether trans status is known in public, the impact on the trans individual, the impact on trans people more widely, whether the witness has a ‘reasonable’ reason.
It is notable that whilst the potential impact on the transgender community more widely must be considered, there is no need to consider the impact on other groups defined by a protected characteristic under the Equality Act. Women, for example.
Of particular concern is that the party who wishes to use sex-based pronouns must have a ‘good enough’ reason: we can envisage the situation where a witness, usually a woman, has to plead her case at the case management stage to use sex-based language. This essentially puts the witness’s beliefs on trial with the real possibility that the judge rules against her because her reasons are not ‘reasonable’ enough, or that her gender critical views fall into the category of ‘unacceptable’. In the cases of domestic abuse or sexual violence that the Bench Book specifically references, this case management stage is ripe to be used as another stage of abuse.
The Bench Book maintains the presumption of a right to privacy for trans people that extends to their sex registered at birth. The Bench Book still presumes that gender identity should be respected in court. By establishing this as the desired and easily achievable default, the weighting is already against using sex-based pronouns.
Chapter 12 is titled Trans People. Gender reassignment is a protected characteristic in the Equality Act (2010) and the law is clear that no individual should be discriminated against on the basis of gender reassignment. However, in common with much current policy and guidance across both public and private sectors, this chapter is steeped in the ideology of gender identity and unquestioningly presents this as established, uncontested fact.
The Bench Book, in this unquestioning acceptance of gender identity, goes far beyond appropriate and reasonable steps to ensure that transgender individuals engaged in legal proceedings do not suffer any disadvantage. Instead, the law is misrepresented, with judges urged to act accordingly. The ramifications of this have significant implications for the openness and transparency of the courts and the judicial process, for media reporting and for witness testimony, including victims of sexual offences.
The first inaccuracy occurs early on in Chapter 12 and informs much of what follows:
The Gender Recognition Act (2004) (‘GRA’) enables transgender people to change their legal gender by applying to the Gender Recognition Panel for a Gender Recognition Certificate (‘GRC’). […] A person who has been issued with a full GRC is entitled to be recognised in the gender stated on their certificate for all purposes… (p. 327)
The Judicial College ignores provisions in the GRA that allow, for example, a male in possession of a GRC to be lawfully treated differently to biological females. Thus, Section 9(3) provides that ‘for all purposes’ is ‘subject to provision made by this Act or any other enactment’. Section 23 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make an order modifying the operation of any enactment or subordinate legislation in relation to individuals who have obtained legal recognition of acquired gender. This provision allows for circumstances, not envisaged at the time the GRA was drafted, where it will be necessary to treat such individuals differently.
Indeed, the GRA gives situations where it is lawful to treat someone in possession of a GRC differently. At Section 12, possession of a GRC does not affect recording of parenthood. Further statement is at Section 20 where the possibility of being convicted of a crime defined as one that only a male can commit is unaffected by possession of a GRC, as is the possibility of being the victim of a crime defined as one that only a female can be the victim of. At Sections 15 and 20, it is provided that primogeniture is unaffected. Section 19 provides that it is permitted to exclude males with a GRC from ‘gender affected sports’ for females where to do so is necessary to ensure fair competition and/or competitor-safety.
The Judicial College also ignores the single-sex exceptions in the Equality Act (2010). At Schedule 3, paragraphs 26, 27 & 28, and Schedule 23, paragraph 3, males may be excluded from single-sex spaces where this is a proportionate means to a legitimate aim. A male may be excluded even if in possession of the protected characteristic gender reassignment and even if in possession of a GRC.
The Judicial College gets the GRA wrong again at page 333 which sets out the Section 22 provisions that make it a criminal offence for someone who has obtained ‘protected information’ in an official capacity that an individual has obtained or applied for a GRC to disclose that information. The Bench Book correctly notes that it is not an offence to disclose such protected information where this is required for court proceedings. However, the conclusion the Judicial College draws is that since court proceedings are specifically mentioned, the intention of the GRA is that disclosure is prohibited in all other sets of circumstances. That is simply incorrect. Section 22 includes other circumstances where protected information may be disclosed, including for the purposes of investigating crime and for the purposes of the social security system or pension scheme.
As barrister Naomi Cunningham explained during oral evidence given to the Women and Equalities Committee Reform of the Gender Recognition Act Inquiry, disclosing information concerning someone’s transgender status can only be criminal if that information has been learned in an official capacity. Where one has not obtained information in an official capacity, it is not a criminal offence to reveal someone is transgender or has obtained or applied for a GRC. Cunningham spoke of the widespread belief, often reflected in policy and guidance, that it is a criminal act to reveal that someone is transgender, no matter on what basis one has learned this information. In any event Section 22 does not apply to a transgender person who has never applied for a GRC.
Cunningham emphasised the wider chilling effect that misunderstanding Section 22 creates and there is evidence of this in the Bench Book. On page 333 the Judicial College states “the court may consider making reporting restrictions under Section 4 of the Contempt of Court Act (1981) to prevent disclosure of a transgender person’s previous name and transgender history, or it may direct a private hearing.” Page 341 instructs judges that ‘deadnaming’, that is using or referring to a transgender person’s previous and now rejected name, must be avoided as it is “highly disrespectful and may well be inhibiting and possibly humiliating to a witness”. This is backed up with reference to Section 22. Transparency and openness in the judicial process are important principles. It should only be in rare and carefully justified circumstances that the right to privacy requires reporting restrictions a private hearing. Arguably referring to biological sex, ‘misgendering’ or ‘deadnaming’ are not included in such circumstances.
To emphasise the lack of any need to refer to biological sex, judges are informed that it is ‘rare’ that the biological sex of a transgender person will need to be referred to in court. The motives of those who believe that it is important are disparaged at page 330 where judges are advised that “It is important to be alive to the fact that the gender history of a person may be something an opponent litigant may seek to use in order to place pressure on them…”.
Reflecting the tendency of policy and guidance more widely, the Judicial College pushes self-ID, stating on page 332 that it should be possible to recognise a person’s gender identity and their present name for nearly all court purposes, regardless of whether they have obtained a GRC and without any further inquiry. Further inquiries are actively discouraged on the grounds that these would be “intrusive and offensive” and may constitute a breach of the individual’s right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
The cumulative effect leaves judges in the position where the gender identity of individuals is to be accepted on the basis of self-ID, transgender people are to be considered as the sex they identify as for all purposes and referring to their biological sex, using pronouns appropriate to that sex and using a now-abandoned name are potentially criminal acts. The motives of counsel who consider biological sex or transgender history to be relevant are viewed with suspicion. Reporting restrictions or private hearings are suggested. This is a chilling effect indeed.
The criminal justice system has been thoroughly captured and is in thrall to ideology of gender identity. Even before this new edition was published, female pronouns and names were consistently used to refer to male offenders who identify as transgender by defence, prosecution, judge and witnesses. Including when the male in question is on trial for serious sexual offences. Victims giving testimony in court have been instructed by the judge to refer to their male attacker as ‘she’. We know that males convicted of sexual offences against children have been referred to at trial as female. Where do the limits lie concerning who will be compelled to describe their male attacker as a woman?
The Judicial College, together with the individuals who contributed to this edition need to be called to account for what is at best careless and at worst wilful misrepresentation of the law. We are all equal before the law, but it appears that the Equal Treatment Bench Book would have it that some are more equal than others.






