TEMPLATE LETTERS
Letter: DBS Checks and Change of Identity
Dear
Re: DBS Checks and Change of Identity
The Disclosure and Barring Service plays a vital role in safeguarding by processing criminal record checks for individuals who have applied to work in roles where safeguarding considerations apply. However, where applicants submit identity documents for DBS checks that display a new identity, safeguarding loopholes are created because the applicant can sever the link with any existing records of offending.
The most wide-reaching loopholes are created where individuals simultaneously change both their name and gender. This is because of the exceptional enhanced privacy rights the DBS grants to individuals who change their gender. The result is that identity verification is compromised, meaning that there is no guarantee that the information returned during a DBS check and displayed on the certificate will be accurate or complete. I am sure you are aware of the recent debates in Parliament concerning the ability of registered sex offenders to change their name. However, change of gender has received less focus and the risk posed by other individuals, not on the sex offenders register, changing their identity has been overlooked.
Any individual can easily, and for any reason, change their name and gender on documents commonly used to establish identity via a process of self-declaration: no gender recognition certificate is required. These documents, that include passport and driving licence, can be presented for the purposes of a DBS check and will show the individual’s new name and their self-declared gender instead of their sex.
Exceptional enhanced privacy rights allow an applicant who has changed gender to request that all their previous names are withheld from their DBS certificate. This right is not given to anyone else: disclosing previous identities is a key component of safeguarding and DBS certificates issued to other individuals display all other names the applicant has used.
Applicants who change their gender are also permitted to conceal their sex and the DBS certificate issued will display their acquired gender instead. The importance of sex to safeguarding means that for all other applicants, their sex is always displayed.
The current operation of the DBS regime means that organisations requesting DBS checks cannot have confidence in the information that is disclosed.
A recent report by the campaign group Keep Prisons Single Sex, DBS Checks and Identity Verification: Safeguarding Loopholes Created by Changes of Identity, proposes:
- Mandatory use of National Insurance numbers for DBS checks and identity changes
- DBS certificates display sex registered at birth
- DBS certificates display other names used for all applicants, including those who have changed gender as part of changing identity
I am sure you will agree that in order to be effective, the rules of safeguarding must apply equally to everyone. Whenever the members of one group are excused from the normal requirements of safeguarding, a loophole is created that is ripe for exploitation.
Please could you write to Sarah Dines, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Safeguarding, asking that she give consideration to these proposals.
Kind regards
Letter: Recording Suspects’ Sex in Crime & Incident Reporting
Dear
Re: Recording Suspects’ Sex in Crime and Incident Reporting
Sex registered at birth is a powerful predictor of outcomes in almost every dimension of social life. Sex registered at birth is established throughout the criminal justice system as important to analysing patterns of offending, pathways into offending and risk. These differences between males and females underpin policy and practice throughout the criminal justice system.
A recent report by Keep Prisons Single Sex, How Police Forces in England and Wales Record Suspects’ Sex in Crime and Incident Reporting, reports on Freedom of Information Access Requests they asked all police forces in the country.
- Only 1 police force stated that they record sex registered at birth as standard
- 22 forces record gender identity, with 20 doing so on the basis of self-declaration
- 17 forces answered specific questions on how rape suspects’ sex is recorded: 14 record gender identity with over 50% doing so on the basis of self-declaration
- 13 forces answered specific questions on how they record the sex of a suspect who identifies as non-binary: 7 stated they record the suspect’s sex as indeterminate, unspecified or other
Offending patterns differ significantly between males and females: males commit the large majority of offences and some offence categories are only rarely committed by females. This means that allocating even 1 or 2 cases of male offending to the female subgroup, on the basis of the suspect’s gender identity, can have a significant impact on the data, compromising its reliability and its utility and relevance to service development.
The recommendations KPSS propose are grounded in the collection of data on the protected characteristics in the Equality Act 2010 and include that the Home Office issue clear centralised guidance that mandates police forces to record suspects’ sex registered at birth. Additional data on gender reassignment as a separate protected characteristic should also be recorded.
Accurate, relevant and reliable data on offending is a legitimate public interest. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the interests of data collection are best served when police forces collect data on suspects’ sex registered at birth. There is no evidence that allowing the substitution of gender identity, or legal gender where a suspect is in receipt of a gender recognition certificate, affords greater (or even equivalent) explanatory power.
Please could you write to Chris Philp, Minister of State (Minister for Crime and Policing) and to Suella Braverman the Home Secretary setting out my concerns and asking that police forces throughout England and Wales are centrally mandated to record the sex registered at birth of suspects.
Kind regards
Letter: Digital Identities: The Safeguarding Risk
Dear
Re: Digital Identities: the Safeguarding Risk
Safeguarding is the framework of measures to protect the health, well-being and human rights of individuals. Certain groups are in particular need of safeguarding, including children and vulnerable adults. Where an individual seeks to work with vulnerable groups, legislation specifies the information that must be disclosed about that individual and information which the individual may keep private.
Where there is a statutory requirement to disclose information, an individual may not assert individual privacy rights to withhold it. However, the individual may be entitled to keep other personal information private. Hard copy identity credentials are “all or nothing” in terms of the personal information they disclose, limiting the ability to withhold personal information. Digital identities, however, permit selective disclosure of information about an individual. A suggestion is that digital identities can enable personal information to be disclosed for selected reasons only in a way that minimises the risk of infringing that individual’s privacy rights.
Some suggest that sex registered at birth is information that an individual has a legitimate right to keep private in some cases. Some describe this as particularly relevant where an individual has changed gender. Digital identities are suggested as more effectively enabling safeguarding, including in the situation where such an individual does not wish to have their sex registered at birth displayed on their identity credentials for everyone to see.
The recent report by Keep Prisons Single Sex, Digital Identities: Safeguarding Solution or Safeguarding Risk, concludes that digital identities create risk. First, the methods that create a digital identity mean that where an individual’s sex registered at birth has been replaced by their legally recognised acquired gender or by self-declared gender on documentation used to establish identity, this will be transferred to the digital identity. Second, the enhanced individual privacy rights currently given to an individual who changes gender, resulting in the concealment of their sex registered at birth on identity credentials and other documentation, including DBS certificates, look set to apply to digital identities. In a future situation where all data recording is digital, an individual who changes gender will remain able to ensure that their sex registered at birth is hidden. There is no evidence that sex registered at birth will be accessible and disclosable where an individual wishes to have their acquired gender, self-declared gender or gender identity recorded instead.
The final concern is that digital identities create their own safeguarding loopholes and risk because they can be shared remotely, including for DBS checks, creating ‘distance’ between the individual and the organisation with statutory responsibility for safeguarding during the process of identity verification.
The recommendations made in the report include:
- The need to retain the accuracy and visibility of sex registered at birth must be established as a fundamental design principle in the rollout of digital identities.
- Careful consideration of the law around personal privacy and confidentiality and responsibilities around personal data protection, areas of law which are frequently and erroneously confused and conflated.
- All digital identities an individual creates must be linked together and contain an audit trail of any changes the individual makes.
- National Insurance numbers are used to link together all digital identities an individual creates. When an individual creates a digital identity, the applicant is required to provide their NI number.
Please could you write to the Rt Hon Lucy Frazer KC, the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and to the Rt Hon Sir John Whittingdale OBE, Minister of State (Minister for Data and Digital Infrastructure) setting out my concerns and asking that they give consideration to these recommendations.
Kind regards






