DIGITAL IDENTITIES
Digital identities have been described as providing a solution to the tension created when the principles of safeguarding and individual privacy rights come into conflict. Safeguarding refers to the framework of measures designed to protect the health, well-being and human rights of individuals. Certain groups of people are in particular need of safeguarding, including children and vulnerable adults, and statutory obligations for safeguarding are set out in legislation. Where an individual seeks to work with vulnerable groups, legislation specifies both the information that must be disclosed about that individual (and the manner in which this information can be requested) and information that must not be shared and which that individual is entitled to keep private.
The balance between individual privacy rights and the legitimate functions of the State to act in the interests of safeguarding is not static. Throughout the development of legislation around safeguarding and the evolution of employment vetting and barring services, there has been a ‘push and pull’ between an individual’s right to privacy and the legitimate function of the State to act in the interests of safeguarding.
Where there is a statutory requirement that certain information must be disclosed, an individual may not assert individual privacy rights in order to withhold that information. However, the individual may be entitled to keep other personal information, that is not covered in statute, private. Hard copy identity credentials are “all or nothing” in terms of the personal information they disclose, placing considerable limits on the ability to withhold personal information. However, digital identities permit the selective disclosure of information about an individual. A suggestion is that, in this way, digital identities can enable sensitive information to be disclosed for carefully specified reasons only and in a way that minimises the risk of infringing that individual’s privacy rights.
This suggestion has been extended to sex registered at birth on the grounds that this is also information that an individual has a legitimate right to keep private in some cases and that they should be enabled to do so. This perceived right has been described as being particularly relevant where the individual has changed gender. The conclusion, therefore, is that digital identities are able to more effectively enable safeguarding, including in the situation where an individual who has changed gender as part of changing their identity does not wish to have their sex registered at birth displayed on their identity credentials.
Our own conclusion, however, is that digital identities do not achieve more effective safeguarding: in fact they create additional risk. Firstly, the methods by which a digital identity is created mean that where an individual’s sex registered at birth has currently been replaced by their legally recognised acquired gender or by self-declared gender on documentation used to establish identity, this will simply be transferred to the newly created digital identity. In this situation, sex registered at birth is information that is simply unavailable. The result is that where an individual’s sex registered at birth should be disclosed, it cannot be because the unavailability of this information continues in the digital realm.
Secondly, there is every indication that the enhanced individual privacy rights currently given to an individual who changes gender as part of changing their identity, resulting in the concealment of their sex registered at birth on identity credentials and on other documentation including DBS certificates, will also apply to digital identities. This means that even in the future situation where all data recording by the state is transferred into the digital realm, an individual who changes gender will remain able to ensure that their sex registered at birth is suppressed. In short: there is no evidence that sex registered at birth will be an accessible and disclosable attribute where an individual wishes to have their acquired gender, self-declared gender or gender identity recorded instead.
Our view is that the enhanced privacy rights that permit individuals who change gender to conceal their sex registered at birth should be challenged. However, the proposed “solution” instead expands these rights to all people to enable everyone to withhold their sex registered at birth in certain circumstances. Whilst the difference between those who do and those who do not change gender is eradicated, this simply serves to bolster the erroneous notions that sex registered at birth is something to which blanket privacy can legitimately attach and that withholding sex registered at birth is without consequence.
Our final concern is that digital identities create their own safeguarding loopholes and risk because their use creates a ‘distance’ between the individual and the organisation with statutory responsibility for safeguarding during the process of identity verification.
Read our report, Digital Identities: Safeguarding Solution or Safeguarding Risk?






